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Reconstructing the Normative
Foundations of Socialism
Dr. Jeff Noonan   University of Windsor 
Résumé
Dans le présent article, j’avance qu’il existe une idée normative de la base de valeur de la 
vie, qui sous-tend les différentes permutations historiques du socialisme. Je m’efforce de 
reconstruire la base normative du socialisme en partant de cette base de valeur. Le but est 
de rendre explicite la valeur généralisable du socialisme comme étant dans les intérêts de 
vie de tout être humain. Vu la détérioration des conditions de vie partout dans le monde, on 
peut espérer stimuler un nouvel intérêt politique pour une solution de rechange socialiste 
ayant de larges bases, contre une économie de marché mondiale de plus en plus aveugle 
à la vie. 
Abstract
In this paper I argue that underlying the different historical permutations of socialism is 
the normative idea of the life-ground of value.  I attempt to reconstruct the normative basis 
of socialism on the basis of this life-ground.  The aim is to make explicit the generalizable 
value of socialism as in everyone’s human life-interests.  In the context of a growing crisis 
of life-conditions across the globe, the hope is to revive political interest in a broad based 
socialist alternative to an increasingly life-blind global market system. 
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Introduction
As an idea that motivated struggles for fundamental social change, ‘socialism’ enjoyed its 
greatest success in periods of social crisis.  By socialism I mean, in general terms, the idea 
of a social order in which the production and distribution of social resources is subject to 
democratic determination, in which the satisfaction of human life-requirements and not 
profit is the governing social value, and in which all citizens are, as far as is concretely 
possible, enabled to freely develop the capabilities that make human life meaningful for 
self and valuable for others.  To say that this idea has had its greatest currency in periods of 
social crisis might seem obvious, but its full significance for a contemporary estimation of 
the plausibility of saving socialism from its own crisis has perhaps not been fully explored. 
When socialists, Marxist or not, think about social crisis they tend to think in economic 
terms, of downturns in production, rising unemployment, attacks on hard-won workplace 
rights, and so forth.  Rarely is the reason why these economic indicators amount to a social 
crisis made fully explicit, even if it is implied.  That which makes these developments more 
than normal economic trends is their relationship to the life prospects of those who are 
negatively impacted by them.  That is, a social crisis is a moment where the quality of life 
of people is undermined by known social processes to such a degree that the unchallenged 
operation of those processes is no longer tolerable, both for those classes who suffer the 
consequences and the class whose social interests rule.  
 
In periods of generalized social crisis standard theoretical (political and economic) and 
normative (philosophical, moral) legitimations of the status quo fail to provide arguments 
strong enough to sap the force of movements for institutional change.  Because social 
stability depends equally upon structural and conscious factors, successful social 
movements depend equally upon political strength and the cogency of the normative 
justifications to which they appeal to legitimate that power to others.  Not only must there 
be a movement large and powerful enough to force change, its demands must be articulated 
through values whose superiority to the established values appears, within the context of 
crisis, sufficient to dissuade the ruling powers from all-out efforts at repression.   As 
Richard Falk argues, “very little of lasting significance occurs without threats posed to the 
established order by those advocates of change sufficiently engaged to mount a struggle, 
take risks, make sacrifices, and in the end, generate incentives for elites to strike bargains 
of accommodation” (2004: 8). The great achievements of the worker’s movement in its 
various permutations, the women’s movement, civil rights and anti-racism movements, 
and the struggle for the rights of sexual minorities have all come about in this way.  They 
 We should distinguish between a period of generalized social crisis which is a long-term set of 
structural problems in which the ruling social value system appears less and less convincing to all 
active social and political groups, and periods of momentary or acute crisis (a riot, local rebellion, 
etc).  While a period of acute crisis (say, the riots in the United States following the assassination 
of Martin Luther King) can be repressed by overt violence periods of generalized social crisis (the 
long conflict over Jim Crow laws in the South of the United States, for example) cannot be solved by 
the simple application of state violence, given the depth of the problems and the ethical and political 
power of the opposition.  It is periods of generalized social crisis that interest me here.
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relied not only on political power, but also on ethical positions that proved normatively 
unassailable and ultimately not defeasible by force.  As I will argue, this history provides 
the clue to future political action, which today should no longer be bogged down by the 
false dichotomy ‘reform or revolution’ but instead concentrate on achieving concrete 
objectives that, if achieved, reconstitute social relations on an ever higher levels of what I 
will call ‘life-grounded organization.’  
      
In general terms, the word crisis denotes a situation where a choice is demanded between 
two incompatible alternatives.  If a crisis is general then major social actors become 
conscious of an alternative that in normal times is suppressed.  Social change is not 
mechanical but depends upon the growth of conscious commitment to new sets of values 
and governing social principles.  The contemporary crisis of socialism is a consequence 
not only of global political and economic changes, but equally of the failure of socialists 
- whether Marxist or social democratic -  to pose normative arguments in terms which are 
convincingly superior to the established reality, even when all the problems of that reality 
are admitted by non-socialists.  In other words, socialists have failed to defend socialism 
in a way that can build solidarity.  Without solidarity, a new, broad-based, non-sectarian 
social movement for a democratic economy that enables people to more freely develop and 
enjoy their vital capabilities in community with others is impossible.
 
The most influential normative perspectives critical of established reality today tend 
to argue against it in terms of human rights and the underlying value of autonomy and 
human dignity.2  Since human rights are developments of classical liberal rights it is far 
from clear to what extent they are a potential basis for the democratic governance of the 
global economy.  On top of their political ambiguities must be piled the philosophical 
confusion that characterises their articulation.  The one document universally agreed to 
by world governments, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is far from internally 
consistent.  Finally, it is also the case that broad-based rhetorical support for human rights 
notwithstanding, the facts on the ground in the world today provide strong evidence that 
they are not solving even the most obvious problems of the degradation of the natural 
environment, growing inequality, and the persistence of absolute poverty.  My aim here 
is not to criticise the idea of human rights or its normative and practical limitations as 
 See for example Nussbaum (006), Sen (1999), Beetham (003), Held (004) and Gould (004). 
Although Habermas tends to focus on national political communities rather than cosmopolitan 
human rights, his arguments share with human rights defenders their normative grounding in the 
more or less Kantian conception of autonomy.  See Habermas (1995; 000).  For more explicitly 
socialist interpretations of Kantian normative foundations see Van der Linden (1988) and Karatani 
(200).   
3 While some progress towards meeting the United Nations Millennium Goals of poverty reduction 
is evident, the trend over the last thirty years, a period dominated by the ‘neo-liberal’ model of 
capitalist globalization (open markets, fewer restrictions on foreign direct investment, roll backs to 
welfare state income support programs, etc) is towards increased inequality and poverty (United 
Nations, 007; Wade, 003).   
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a framework to solve key global problems.  I have explored the problems of trying to 
derive a solution to fundamental global social problems from human rights elsewhere, and 
Gary Teeple has articulated in great detail the internal inconsistencies of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (Noonan, 006a; Teeple, 004).
Instead my aim here is positive and reconstructive.  My goal is to reconstruct the normative 
foundations of socialism according to what McMurtry calls the “life-ground of value.”  In 
general terms the “life-ground of value” is the total set of conditions upon which the 
existence and living things depends (1998: 4).  This ground of value discloses an essential 
relationship between fundamental life requirements or needs, the natural resources and 
social institutions necessary to satisfy them, and the realization of the vital capabilities of 
living things that makes their lives valuable to self and others.4  I will argue that the globe 
is currently facing a universal social crisis of life-conditions as a result of the operation 
of the social value system that underlies and justifies capitalist globalization.  This claim 
does not mean that capitalism is incapable of satisfying human life-requirements, but 
rather that its normal metric of value understands human and other life as valuable only 
to the extent that it is profitably exploitable.  It is thus incapable, on its own terms, of 
comprehending reduction or destruction of life-value when its reduction or destruction 
is profitable by the system-metric of increasing  money-capital. Thus, if it is profitable to 
employ labour in dangerous conditions, at work that is both harmful to individual workers 
and socially valueless as a contribution to life-requirements, this situation will appear as 
a good from the perspective of the ruling value system.  Any turning away from this sort 
of life-destructive practice will occur only as the result of struggles mounted against them 
from a life-grounded perspective.  The point to be established is that the ruling value 
system cannot recognise the damage it causes to life so long as it remains unconfronted by 
life-grounded alternatives.  Given the space limitations of an essay-length argument I will 
have to confine my comments to a general level.  
By reconstructing this crisis in terms of the global degradation of life-conditions the 
argument hopes to obviate charges that it is defending a self-interested normative-
political position.  If there really is a crisis of life-conditions then it affects everyone’s 
4 The use of the terms ‘needs’ and ‘capabilities’ suggests a superficial resemblance between the 
life-grounded approach to social criticism and Sen and Nussbaum’s ‘capabilities’ approach to human 
justice.  I will not explain in any detail the differences between these approaches, but for the sake 
of clarity the basic differences are: 1) neither Sen nor Nussbaum explicitly define needs or examines 
the instrumental relation between needs and capability realization in any explicit detail; ) Sen 
and Nussbaum prioritise the value of choice, my approach, while not ignoring the value of choice 
identifies the realization of capabilities as of ultimate value; 3) Sen and especially Nussbaum develop 
their capabilities approach as a species of liberalism, my interpretation of the life-ground of value 
leads to socialist conclusions; and 4) Sen and Nussbaum are critics of certain policy options for 
governing global capitalism, the ultimate practical conclusion of my approach is that capitalism itself 
is the essential global problem.  These differences do not mean that there are not great strengths to 
Sen and Nussbaum’s work or that there is no connection between their theories and the life-ground 
of value.  The differences, however, should not be underestimated.
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continued existence and, if socialism is the name applied to a general conception of life-
grounded socio-economic priorities and democratic economic institutions, then it cannot 
be rejected as a ‘special’ interest’ (of Marxists, workers, etc.).  This reconstruction of 
normative foundations cannot of course guarantee the political efficacy of the position. 
The extent to which it is practically useful in building solidarity cannot be determined 
by its philosophical explication and defence.  I hope only to demonstrate that conceiving 
of socialism as the most consistent political manifestation of the life-ground of value 
best articulates the true universality of socialist values, their pressing relevance to the 
structure of global social crisis, and consequently that a non-sectarian socialism is a living 
possibility today.    
A Global Crisis of Life-Conditions
If it is true that the political power of socialism is contingent upon its responding effectively 
to a general sense of social crisis, then the first step in rebuilding the plausibility of a 
socialist alternative to global capitalism is to explain the different manifestations of global 
crisis today according to a unifying principle.  Treatments of global problems in the popular 
media do not so much suppress discussion of the main issues (environmental degradation, 
poverty, etc.), as to treat different elements in abstraction from one another and the general 
dynamics and value system of global political economy.  The popular media thus operate 
on the assumption that the ‘fundamentals’ of global social interaction are sound and that all 
that needs to be done is to fine tune and coordinate different policies in different regions of 
the globe and different dimensions of social life.  This fragmentary treatment encourages 
fragmentary consciousness and fragmentary consciousness encourages single-issue forms 
of political activity.  A unified account of global social crisis is the precondition (but not 
a guarantee) of the gradual emergence of unified understanding and a solidaristic global 
movement for fundamental change.
The unifying principle that can link together the different elements of global crisis is the 
life-ground of value.  The life-ground of value is implicit in every account of a crisis in 
so far as life is the necessary precondition of meaning and value.  In other words, were 
there no life on earth, there could be no problems either, since the existence of a problem 
presupposes beings for whom existence is a matter of better and worse.  Every social 
problem, therefore, is a problem in so far as it imposes worse conditions on life than would 
exist in different social conditions.  Better and worse life conditions, however, require an 
objective standard against which alternatives can be evaluated.  In the absence of objective 
standards better life conditions will always be identified with existing social arrangements 
or with merely abstract ideals whose possibility cannot be determined with any certainty. 
Fortunately for the social critic, life itself carries with it the objective standards required. 
All life forms depend upon the satisfaction of relatively invariant life requirements, or 
needs.  Needs are, in general terms, universal life requirements which, if not satisfied, 
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lead to objective forms of harm.  Thus needs can be distinguished from subjective wants 
or desires by the criterion: “N is a need, if and only if, and to the extent that, deprivation of 
N always results in a reduction of organic capability” (McMurtry, 1998: 164). Life-needs 
which, if unmet, generate objective forms of harm is, nevertheless, a controversial claim, 
and not only amongst neo-liberals who conflate need with consumer demand, but even 
amongst astute critics of capitalism.  The latter tend to worry about culturally imperialist 
forms of thought and practice which would coercively impose the needs of western society 
on the needs of quite different societies (De Martino, 2000).  I will not repeat here at 
great length responses to these objections that I have developed more fully elsewhere, 
since my aim is not to settle every abstract philosophical dispute but to set out a general 
case for a new conception of the normative foundations of socialism. (Noonan, 006b; 
Assiter and Noonan, 007).  Nevertheless, some response is called for if that case is to be 
convincing.
The first objection is easier to respond to than the second.  The neo-liberal argument is 
nicely encapsulated by Friedrich von Hayek’s ethical defence of the market.  Von Hayek 
claims that “there can exist ... no single ordering of needs” (1976: 113).  There are only 
consumer demands and these are not determined by any facts of human social-organic 
nature but only by observing what in fact different people are willing to pay for.  This 
position, however, clearly rests upon an uncritical psychologism which cannot survive 
confrontation with the facts of human existence.  If we define needs relative to harms, the 
neo-liberal can respond that people feel harmed when they are deprived of the means of 
consuming whichever commodities they happen to feel like consuming.  Harm is always 
agent-relative and is essentially a subjective feeling of deprivation.  That this subjective 
feeling of deprivation is not actually harm is easily proven through an example.  Subjective 
feelings of harm are no doubt real, but they can be overcome through changing one’s 
self-interpretation in such a way that one’s consciousness opens towards the superior 
value of higher levels of activity.  For example, the smoker who can no longer smoke in 
a restaurant will no doubt feel deprived relative to smokers in other jurisdictions who 
are still able to smoke indoors.  Rather than rail against anti-smoking laws, however, she 
or he could use these restrictions as a reason to try to quit smoking.  If successful, the 
debilitating addiction will give way to increased ranges of activity, better health, and 
a renewed sense of independence from predatory corporate drug dealers.  The same 
reasoning holds across the board when what is at issue is the consumption of commodities 
which have no demonstrable connection to increasing the ability of people to develop and 
express the fundamental cognitive, imaginative, and materially creative capabilities that 
distinguish human life.  The feeling of harm disappears as soon as the addiction is broken 
and one experiences for oneself higher levels of activity and superior forms of capability 
realization.  The same reasoning does not hold, however, in relation to actual needs.  A 
brain deprived of oxygen for significant amounts of time will suffer catastrophic failures 
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of functioning.  The depth of the loss of cognitive capability may be such that the subject 
is not even conscious of it.  Lack of consciousness of the loss of capability in this case, 
however, is proof of the objectivity of the harm.
The second objection is more difficult to meet.  It is indeed the case that there is a real 
legacy of powerful groups usurping for themselves the right to define for everyone the scope 
of their needs.  Thus, for example, successive Canadian governments in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries enacted the policy of residential schooling in order to satisfy what they 
defined as the ‘needs’ of the children of First Nations people. It can reasonably be objected 
that this form of residential schooling was in reality not need-satisfying, but brutal cultural 
imperialism.  While the life-grounded perspective agrees, it would nevertheless refuse the 
inference (drawn by postmodern social critics) that there is therefore no general human 
need for education, but only culturally relative needs that must remain plural. The need 
for education, from the life-grounded perspective, is grounded in the social-organic nature 
of human beings, in the fact that the cognitive abilities of the brain can only develop 
through a rich variety of structured experiences and symbolic interactions.  A human 
being deprived of all sensory inputs and structured symbolic interactions would not 
even be able to develop basic capabilities like language use, and without the ability to 
use language at all, it would prove impossible to assimilate any richer cultural content 
no matter what the identity of the person. As an overview of recent research into early 
childhood neural development concludes, “an impoverished environment diminishes the 
brain. Unfortunately, many children’s brains are starving due to a lack of attention and 
the right kinds of experiences. Without the opportunity to be used, neurons can actually 
wither away and die” (Department of Early Learning, 007: 1). Yet no specific form of 
institutionalising this need follows from the general need for education.  Education is not a 
mechanical or physiological process that can simply be induced; it has irreducible symbolic 
dimensions which entail that effective forms of education must be grounded in (but not 
reducible to) the culturally specific backgrounds of students.  In other words, the same 
human brains, existing concretely in different symbolic matricies, require different forms 
of institutions to attain the same general range of cognitive and imaginative capabilities. 
While forms of education must develop in response to changing social and scientific 
environments, it does not follow that changes can be successfully imposed by force.  The 
alienation and anomie produced by external force undermines whatever pedagogical 
benefit more complex forms of education might have. However, it does not follow from 
the necessity of culturally appropriate educational content that the need for education is 
culturally specific.  The need for education follows from the nature of the human brain, 
whose cognitive and creative capabilities do not automatically or naturally develop. Critics 
of cultural imperialism tend to conflate needs (universal) and need-satisfiers (specific) 
(Doyal and Gough, 1991).  Cultural imperialism is a form of falsely universalizing specific 
need-satisfiers, rather than (as is assumed) imposing needs.  A genuine need is not only 
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universal, its universality can be discovered to be such by anyone who thinks critically 
about what is required and what is not required to develop their basic human capabilities. 
McMurtry’s criterion is not intended to dictate to everyone what their needs are but rather 
is a tool of critical self and social reflection.  It enables people to think for themselves, to 
distinguish needs from forms of desire coercively imposed on them.  It neither entails a 
culturally coercive set of needs to be imposed by social power nor any specific form of 
institutionalising the needs its use uncovers.  
Thus, to argue that the different problems that the world confronts today are manifestations 
of an underlying crisis of life-conditions is to say that the global crisis is a crisis of need-
satisfaction.  If needs are objective life-requirements, then consciousness of the global 
crisis as a crisis of life-conditions unifies understanding of the problem across all forms 
of social difference.  It does not follow, of course, that people will draw the same practical 
and political solutions.  As I noted, however, practical agreement cannot be produced 
by philosophical argument alone.  Nevertheless, if a convincing case can be made for 
this understanding of global problems, one major hurdle in the race to a unified global 
movement has been cleared.   I will now turn to the task of setting out the basic problems 
of the world today from the perspective of the life-ground of value.  I will then turn to the 
task of connecting each of these problems to the more or less unregulated operations of 
the value system of the global economy.  In the final section I will explain how the shared 
forms of fundamental human need and capability can be interpreted as a new normative 
foundation for socialism.
 
The following list of manifestations of the crisis of life-conditions ranges from generalized 
threats to organic life to threats to the specific socio-cultural, political, and temporal 
nature of human life. 
1) Generalized Environmental Crisis
A snowless 006 December in much of Canada accomplished what more than a decade
of scientific argument failed to produce, namely, a growing social consensus that climate 
change is a serious threat to the continued health of established patterns of planetary life. 
Whether the cause of climate change is attributed to the industrial growth economy in 
general, or to the specific dynamics of capitalism, is not essential to establishing the claim 
that there is a growing recognition that unlimited economic growth that does not take 
account of the necessity of a healthy natural field of life-support is materially irrational and 
unsustainable.5  Climate change, however, is not the only sign of the increasingly degraded 
ability of the natural world to support life.  To climate change must be added a growing 
extinction crisis affecting large mammals, large marine life and, perhaps most serious 
5 The debate between a generalized critique of industrial growth and the Marxist critique of 
specifically capitalist forms of growth is too complex to do justice to it here.  An excellent overview 
of the intersections and debates between Marxism and ‘ecology’ may be found in Benton (1996).  
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over the long term, plankton that forms the basis of oceanic food chains (International 
Conservation Union, 000).  Underlying both climate change and the extinction crisis is 
the ever rising demand of human life for more energy.  The essentially thermodynamic 
basis of environmental crisis is generally unexamined in popular discussions, perhaps 
because when it is put in terms of rising energy demand the necessity of a fundamentally 
different pattern of social and economic development becomes obvious.  There is no way 
to satisfy ever rising demand for energy no matter what form of energy societies try to 
utilise.  The entire planet cannot be covered in windmills and solar energy is not efficient 
for large scale industrial enterprises.  The point is that widespread damage to life on earth 
- human and non-human alike - is inevitable so long as the ‘good life’ is identified with 
higher standards of living measured by the quantity of goods and services that people 
consume.    
2)  Generalized Crisis of Basic Human Life Conditions
Human life depends not only on its place within the planetary web of life, but also on 
the specific social conditions in which it reproduces itself through social labour.  In its 
most basic dimension the crisis of life-conditions for humanity appears as the scourge of 
absolute poverty that still affects more than 2 billion people who are forced to try to subsist 
on less that  dollars (US) per day (United Nations, 003: 5).  The world’s poorest peoples 
live in countries dependent upon the export of raw materials whose prices are too low to 
support projects of basic social need-satisfaction.  International trading rules continue 
to be stacked in favour of wealthy Northern countries, as is to be expected in a world 
where law codifies existing social power relations.  The growing rhetorical consensus 
around human rights has not led to the sorts of deep value changes necessary to support a 
serious international commitment to wealth redistribution.  Poverty, however, is not only 
a problem in the global South.  Its life-damaging effects reproduce themselves fractal-
like in rich nations, in rich provinces and states, in rich cities, and rich neighbourhoods. 
Women and children the world over suffer disproportionally from the harms of absolute 
poverty.
It is true, on the other hand, that market reforms in India and especially China have had 
great success is creating a growing urban middle class and in alleviating poverty for 
millions of people.  These successes should not be dogmatically dismissed by socialists 
in the West.  At the same time, it is necessary for any critical analysis of global life-
conditions to note the limitations of this model of social development.  The growth of 
urban middles classes is a reality, but it has barely touched the deep poverty of rural areas. 
As Greg Palast notes sarcastically in response to Thomas Freidman’s paean to Indian 
economic development: 
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The average Indian can’t even afford eighteen holes on the weekend - 79.9 percent of 
the population still makes under 2 dollars per day ... the new flat earthers might say 
that two bucks a day wage is the vestige of the old India, or rural fields with oxen-
plowed fields.  What about the new India, the manufacturing colossus that lifted 
India’s gross domestic output by 48 percent per worker  ... in just six years.  In those 
same six years wages in this modernized manufacturing sector went from 25 cents 
per hour to ... 23 cents per hour (2006: 155-156).  
The situation in China bears the traces of exactly the same contradiction.  As David Harvey 
argues, “the situation in China is fraught with dangers.  There has actually been a net loss 
of manufacturing jobs there since 1995 - more than 15 million (15 percent of the total) 
- due to the bankruptcy of many ... village enterprises .... power shortages are frequent ... 
and labour relations highly unstable ... class equalities appear to be increasing” (200: 
9). When one re-thinks Indian and Chinese development from the perspective of the 
energy demands that would be required to sustain this level of growth, the hopelessness of 
this model of capitalist development becomes all too apparent.  A solution to the problems 
of global poverty cannot be coherently conceived along lines of untrammelled capitalist 
development.  Instead it will require a redistribution of global income within a different set 
of economic institutions governed democratically according to life-grounded priorities.
3) Generalized Crisis of the Social, Cultural, and Political Form of Human Life
Humans share with all other life forms on the planet basic organic needs.  However, the 
specific evolutionary history of the human species has produced an organ, the brain, with 
the unique capability of generating individuated perspectives on reality and establishing 
meaningful relationships with the world.  In short, human nature cannot be understood 
from any one-sided biological-evolutionary perspective.  The human organism depends 
upon social relations and interactions, not only for continued organic life, but, equally 
important from the specifically human point of view, meaningful and valuable forms 
of activity and interaction.  A life led without meaningful and valuable activity, for self 
and for others, is generally agreed to be a misfortune for the life-bearer, a ‘waste’ of 
life. The realization of the capabilities of our self-consciousness - for original cognitive 
and imaginative thought, for world and self-transforming modes of creative action, for 
non-instrumental and mutually rewarding relationships, for work that contributes to the 
overall health and value of society, and for deliberative participation in public affairs - 
are dependent not only on satisfying the fundamental needs of our organism, but also on 
satisfying uniquely human socio-cultural and political needs.  Socio-cultural and political 
needs are satisfied through the forms of social interaction established by prevailing social 
institutions and the social morality and value system that regulate and legitimate their 
normal operations.  It is a peculiarity of capitalism that the operation and values of major 
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social institutions are governed by the overriding value of serving the profitable expansion 
of the economic system.  Hence governments conceive of the national interest primarily 
in terms of international competitiveness.  International competitiveness is defined in 
terms of attracting investment. In order to attract investment all other social institutions 
have to be ‘re-engineered’ to serve the interests of international capital.  Thus political 
institutions, educational institutions, artistic practices and other cultural forms face severe 
pressures to conform to the norms of global market dynamics.  Given the fact that humans 
individuate themselves within major social institutions, the priorities of the global economy 
as mediated by these major institutions come to dominate their self-consciousness.  Hence 
human individuals come to think of all forms of activity as ‘investments’ - people ‘invest’ 
in their education, their relationships, their future.  The overall result, no matter where on 
the globe we look, is what Erich Fromm called “automation conformity” (1965: 183-04). 
Automation conformity is the adaptive behaviour of people confronted by forces they 
believe that they cannot control. They thus internalize its norms of action no matter how 
life-value impoverishing these might be.  Hence the generalized crisis of life conditions at 
the social, cultural and political level is manifested as the growing instrumentalization of 
specifically human capabilities.  That is, the capabilities that make us human are reduced 
to merely instrumental values to be exploited by capitalist enterprise.  
4) Generalized Crisis of the Temporal Framework of Human Life
The value of human life is not fully realized simply through the development of creative 
capabilities.  These capabilities can be developed unfreely, i.e., as conformist responses to 
economic forces when prevailing social conditions leave people with no real alternative. 
Hence there is a difference between developing creative capabilities and freely developing 
those capabilities. In addition to satisfying the basic organic and socio-cultural political 
needs of human beings the free development of creative capabilities depends upon the 
satisfaction of a need, first systematically explored by Marx but implicit in much of Western 
philosophy, for free time (Marx, 1986). Considered from an existential perspective in 
abstraction from concrete social determinations free time is an experience of time as an 
open matrix of possibilities for life-activity.  Humans confront their life-time in a way that 
other life-forms do not, as necessarily and unalterably finite.  Consciousness of the necessity 
of death (regardless of whether one believes in an afterlife) entails the prioritisation of the 
actual realization of possibilities for meaningful and valuable activity on earth.  Human 
freedom presupposes an experience of time as an open matrix of possibilities as opposed 
to a pre-determined sequence of pre-programmed activities.  If the experience of time as 
an open matrix of possibility is absent one cannot imaginatively reflect on one’s deepest 
possibilities and how they might be realized.  Absent this experience of free time, life 
appears as a closed routine into which one must conform one’s activity.  Freedom, by 
contrast, demands that the filling of life-time be responsive to one’s own choices about 
one’s highest capabilities.  
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The concrete experience of time, however, is not an abstract existential problem but is 
mediated by the organization of time in major social institutions.  As Marx was the first to 
demonstrate, the experience of time is radically transformed under capitalism (Marx, 1986; 
Braverman, 1988; Postone, 003).  Rather than being experienced as an open matrix of 
possibilities, time is quantified (now down to the nanosecond speeds of microprocessors) in 
accordance with the imperatives of capitalist efficiency.  The consequence for citizens are 
two-fold.  First, for those who are unfortunate enough not to find remunerative employment, 
time is experienced as an empty but crushing burden.  Since few if any possibilities can 
be realized in a capitalist world without money, absence of money entails absence of the 
key social condition of activity, and absence of the social condition of activity tends to 
encourage feelings of worthlessness and the social pathologies (boredom, addiction, etc.) 
that such feelings bring in their wake.  For those who are remuneratively employed, work-
time is experienced as a reified power that determines the content of life activity (this point 
holds whether one is a worker or a manager).  Movements and thoughts are determined by 
the organization of production, not freely in relation to how the individual thinks or feels 
his or her activity should be expressed.  This same quantification of time according to a 
standard external to different forms of human activity structures life outside the workplace 
as well.  Life becomes ‘modularised’ and routinised, a pre-determined sequence of 
leisure activity, consuming activity, and commodified social and sexual relations (Van 
der Poel, 200).  In short, rather than enabling people to organize time in response to 
freely determined life projects, the quantification of time under capitalism determines 
life-projects in relation to patterns of behaviour calculated with frightening precision to 
produce the most efficient levels of output.     
 
These four determinants of crisis have been expounded at a quite general level in order 
to bring out their shared relation to universal life requirements.  I do not claim to have 
explicated every nuance and permutation of differently situated peoples’ experience of 
these determinants.  The concrete differences of people’s experiences are central to the 
actual building of effective social movements.  Effective social movements, however, also 
require shared frameworks for the political interpretation of different experiences.  That 
this shared framework is built on more than mere inference from stipulated principles is 
evident from the reality of movements addressed to each of these manifestations of crisis. 
The global environmental movement represents a complex manifestation of growing 
consciousness of the intrinsic value of life in its different earthly forms. Although it 
is often abstracted from a critique of the material and symbolic contexts that structure 
definite histories of oppression, the growing consensus around the value of human rights 
expresses a growing consciousness of the contradiction between human dignity and the 
costs imposed on billions of people by the dynamics and value system of global market 
forces.  Debates around multiculturalism, participatory and deliberative democracy, and 
the value of education manifest an awareness of the reality of social, political, and cultural 
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needs.  Finally, while it is often treated in the popular press as an expression of middle 
class burnout, arguments about the importance of ‘work-life balance’ testify to the reality 
of the harm caused people by loss of free time.  What is lacking in these movements 
is consciousness of a unifying principle that explains the depth cause of these different 
manifestations of crisis.
To argue that the crisis facing the globe is a unified crisis of life-value is to say that the 
ruling socio-economic and political forces and powers systematically fail to understand the 
proper relation between the value of life and that which serves life.  Whether one is talking 
about harms done to the web of planetary life, the satisfaction of the basic organic needs 
of human beings, the development of principles of institutional governance that ensure the 
cultivation of peoples’ specifically human capabilities, or the priorities of the economic 
system, the depth cause of the problems is an inversion of value between life-requirements 
and system-requirements.  The global capitalist economy and the political regimes that 
support its extension treat life as an instrument of the further growth of the value of that 
system (i.e. profit).  Human needs are satisfied if and only if people can pay for the need-
satisfiers and only if it is profitable to produce them.  All major social institutions face 
challenges to prove their relevance to the ‘real world,’ (i.e. the world of economic (money) 
value).  All people are subjected to the pressure of instrumentalizing their own lifetime to 
ensure that each moment is ‘expended’ in the most ‘profitable’ way.  In sum, life, which 
alone is intrinsically valuable, is subordinated to the value of the capitalist economy.  
I will return to the question of the realizability of a life-grounded socialist alternative 
in the final section.  To conclude this section it is necessary to explain and justify more 
completely the essential argument here - that a life-blind decision-structure is essential 
to capitalism.  To argue that capitalism’s decision-structure is life-blind does not mean 
that no life-requirements are satisfied under its rule.  Nor does it mean that capitalism 
has not proven itself superior, from the standpoint of productivity, to hitherto attempted 
alternatives.  What it does mean is that the framing values within which economic decisions 
are made (and political policy relevant to economic decisions formulated) understand 
life-value in terms of the growth of money-value.  This reduction of life-value to money 
value always supports policies or decisions that assume that the return of money-profit to 
powerful economic agents is identical to an increase of life-value for all.  This elision of 
the difference between life-value and money-value results in a systematically unnoticed 
inversion of life and money value.  The assumption is always that gains in profitability 
equal gains for life-value, and once this assumption has been made it is impossible to 
detect, from within that decision-structure, failures of life-requirement satisfaction.  Take 
for example a startling article published in December 006 in Newsweek (007) that 
reported that the Iraqi economy was growing and, indeed, booming, in some sectors. This 
judgement constructs the economy in narrow money-value terms, and thus concludes that 
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the Iraqi economy is healthy even though living conditions have reached near collapse for 
the majority of the population.  From within the money-value decision structure life-need-
deprivation does not factor into the evaluation of the state of the economic system.  Given 
this evaluation, no need for a fundamental shift of investment priorities will ever appear. 
The same set of economic policies demonstrably failing to meet basic life-requirements 
will persist unless a change of course is forced from the outside, via the agency of life-
grounded political movements.
This example is only one from the one hundred and fifty year period of global capitalist 
dominance.  The political history of that period is punctuated by clashes between the 
money-value system and various life-grounded movements of opposition.  The history of 
life-grounded movements of opposition is a complex narrative of partial successes.  On 
the one hand, these movements  have succeeded in imposing life-requirement priorities on 
the capitalist system.  On the other, this same history expresses a failure to fundamentally 
transform that decision-structure and the forms of social power that employ it in their 
particular interests.  The sets of social problems that persist from decade to decade over 
one hundred and fifty years cannot be adequately explained as accidental results of poor 
policies choices. Instead their persistence is the empirical ground for the conclusion that 
there are systematic causes underlying particular social failures of life-value realization.  
The systematic cause of the set of problems examined is the way in which value must 
be understood in capitalism.  Smith and Marx called this value ‘exchange value;’ it may 
be more rhetorically effective to follow McMurtry and call it money value.  Whichever 
language one chooses, the essential point is the same; the wealth generating capability 
of capitalism follows from its measuring value in terms of an abstract measure that has 
no natural limit to its increase.  When an economic system measures value in terms of 
money, and its possession becomes the presupposition of both survival and (feelings of) 
happiness, human intelligence will be marshalled in the service of discovering more 
and more efficient ways of creating it.  The idea of having ‘too much money’ is strictly 
inconceivable from a capitalist perspective, since the point of having money is not to hoard 
it but to reinvest it to make even more. Does any other principle better explain the history 
of capitalism viewed in general terms and regardless of whether one wants to laud or 
criticise the system?  
 
At the same time, because money interposes itself between life-requirement and life-
resource, people become socially blind to the costs that this conception of value necessarily 
imposes on those who, for systematic economic reasons, lack it.  Life-requirement is 
assimilated to consumer demand.  Those without money, as Marx pointed out in the 1844 
Manuscripts, lack, from the capitalist perspective, the life-requirements money alone can 
satisfy (1975: 7).  Hence as soon as the universal measure of value is money, the system 
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cannot recognise the instrumentalization of life-value that inevitably follows.    
This way of measuring social health, however, actually contradicts the real health of 
society.  Since economies depend upon the wider natural field of life-support and the 
complex symbolic-institutional structures of human society, they become materially 
irrational when their patterns of growth harm these conditions of existence. No one would 
disagree with the claim that an agricultural economy that depended upon a system of 
irrigation that knowingly increased the salinity of the soil was operating with a materially 
irrational system of production.  Yet this self-destructive tendency is precisely the drive 
motor of capitalism when it is viewed over the long term.  This fact points to a normative 
principle.  Economies develop from the fact of human life-requirements; better and worse 
economies, judged from this life-grounded perspective, therefore ought to be judged in 
terms of how well they satisfy the full range of organic, social, cultural, and political, and 
temporal needs, (within the known carrying capacity of the natural environment and with 
due respect paid to the value of other life forms).  On the one hand, as Marx emphasized, 
the historically progressive role of capitalism was to have vastly increased the productive 
capability of human societies.  The life-costs of the specifically capitalist form of economic 
growth, however, can no longer be ignored and increasingly cannot be tolerated, either 
by the natural field of life-support or the symbolic-institutional structures through which 
the specifically human life-capabilities are developed, realized, and enjoyed.  Hence 
the generalized crisis of life-values points the world towards a shared need for a global 
alternative.  To conclude, I will argue that this systematic, life-grounded alternative, is best 
understood in general terms as socialism.
  
5) Socialism and Life-Value
In its many different historical permutations spanning the extremes of revolution and social 
democratic reformism in all their variants,  the meaning of socialism is always linked to an 
economic system that prioritises human life-requirement satisfaction over considerations 
of profit.  The major differences one finds in the history of socialism concern less the goals 
of a socialist society than the most appropriate means of achieving them. The generality 
and increasing severity of life-crises today, combined with the global weakness of socialist 
movements and ideas, leads to the practical conclusion that the important twentieth century 
debate between reformist and revolutionary roads to socialism is counter-productive. 
Whether or not socialism ultimately requires a revolutionary break with capitalism, as, 
for example, Callinicos maintains, or whether it can be achieved by a quasi-evolutionary 
re-conquest of life-resources from their current subordination to commodity markets, 
as I maintain, is an empirical question and not a matter of normative first principles 
(Callinicos, 003). All can agree that it is ahistorical to expect a universal leap of public 
consciousness from its current indifference or hostility to socialism to a fervent embrace 
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of revolution.  If that is true, then it follows that the best practical strategy to reinvigorate 
socialist movements is to articulate its goals and values in non-sectarian life-grounded 
terms whose centrality to the health and freedom of anyone is undeniable from all but the 
most partisan positions.  These goals and values, in turn, must be connected to a political 
project whose plausibility is ensured by its first steps being realizable within the given 
structure of actually existing social, political, and economic institutions.
 
While it is not possible here to provide a complete political project for the evolutionary 
transformation of capitalism into socialism, it is important to at least defend the plausibility 
of this approach.  The key to such a defence seems to me to discover, within the given 
structures of institutional organization, spaces where new forms of democratic, life-
grounded economic organization can emerge on a wide enough scale that they provide 
evidence that another way of life is possible.  These new forms of economic organization 
and governance need not be non-capitalist initially (i.e. workers coops or non-commodified 
delivery of public services).  Such developments have their merits, but tend to be local and 
forced to rely upon the will of committed activists to sustain themselves (or, if they are 
successful, to be re-absorbed by commodity markets, as many kibbutz’s in Israel have 
been).  A better approach, because more socially diffused, is to make demands on existing 
social institutions that are, in the words of Pat Devine (1988), ‘prefigurative’ of a new 
society.  Devine, in his superb Democracy and Economic Planning constructs a consistent 
model for a negotiated coordination economy that would gradually replace the rule of 
market forces in the production, distribution, and use of life-resources with democratic 
planning.  The model is too complex to do justice to here.  The only point I want to stress 
is the way in which Devine’s conception of prefigurative demands provides an alternative 
to a revolutionary road which seems, for all practical purposes, dead, and a reformism 
which, where it has not politically regressed to Blair’s Third Way reconciliation with the 
privatising agenda of global capitalism, finds itself in a crisis of political stagnation. 
 
The key political value of Devine’s (1988) approach is that it relies upon a norm of self-
government that is central to the legitimacy of liberal-democratic capitalism but which is 
not itself liberal and indeed, when extended to the economy, ‘prefigurative’ of a democratic 
socialist economy.  By exploiting the ideological currency of the idea of self-government 
and demanding that its practices be extended to economic institutions, Devine lights 
upon a political strategy revolutionary in its ultimate implications, but realizable through 
an evolutionary dynamic.   The key to realizing the overall implications of the idea of 
democratic economic governance is for movements to fight for and achieve progressively 
deeper levels of democratic control over economic life on the basis of the actually existing 
(but limited) means of participation operative in even the ‘freest’ of free markets.  The 
actually existing means of participation that forms the link for Devine between the 
capitalist present and a possible democratic socialist future is negotiation.    
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The difference between the type of negotiation that goes on now and the type that Devine 
(1988) proposes is a difference of degree, not kind.  The best evidence for the plausibility of 
Devine’s model is the reality of planning and negotiation in the actual capitalist economy 
as it exists. The money-value decision structure that drives the capitalist economy has 
been everywhere enmeshed in a more complex legal, institutional, political, and cultural 
contexts as a consequence of successful democratic life-value counter-pressures.  As a 
result, in every capitalist nation, and even in the standard-bearer of open markets, the 
United States, planning and negotiation is ubiquitous.  Price-signals may ultimately rule 
corporate decisions, but they are not self-evident in terms of what they imply at the level 
of corporate strategy.  Corporations do not make investment or divestment decisions over 
night, but meet to discuss and argue about how best to respond to changing economic 
circumstances.  They generate long-term forecasts and determine future courses of action 
accordingly.  Nor do nations simply leave the course of their economic futures up to market 
forces exclusively. Every nation retains some degree of control over macroeconomic 
factors and all publish national budgets.  National budgets set out economic priorities 
and encourage or discourage different forms of economic activity through tax rates and 
other sorts of direct and indirect regulation.  Political parties and social movements plan 
party and movement activities in accordance with agreed upon objectives.  Governments, 
unions, social movements and businesses are constantly negotiating and re-negotiating 
the terms of economic life, who will benefit and who will suffer increased costs, as 
well as over which values ought to govern society.  As Devine concludes, “in the most 
successful capitalist countries, even those apparently most ... market-oriented, the long-run 
development of the economy is not left primarily to the determination of market forces. 
Some degree of ex ante coordination is attempted, both within and between industries and 
sectors” (1988:  5).  At present, however, these processes of negotiation are embedded 
in a structure of social power that is fundamentally asymmetrical which guarantees that 
in normal cases it is the interests of money-capital that carry the day. The democratic, 
life-grounded potential of negotiation is thus suppressed beneath the ruling power of the 
money-grounded ruling value system and the classes that derive private advantage from it. 
Nevertheless, negotiation still represents a real, if implicit, democratic moment existing 
within the capitalist system. Devine’s model for a self-governing society is thus rooted in 
real processes of planning and negotiation central to actual economic life.  On analogy 
with the universalization of civil and political rights over the past 00 years, it argues 
that those currently shut out of negotiation and planning, or those who voice is effectively 
marginalised when decisions are made, be formally and substantively included.   The 
evolutionary development towards socialism would thus be brought about by successful 
political conquest of terrain currently controlled by major capitalist institutions on the 
basis of practices that those institutions rely upon (but currently are able to manipulate in 
their own private interests).
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However, while I believe that Devine’s prefigurative demands to transform current forms of 
negotiation represents the best alternative to revolutionary socialism and social democratic 
reformism, it cannot be achieved to even a minimal degree without political organization 
and struggle.  Successful political organization and struggle, in turn, requires solidarity, 
and solidarity ultimately rests upon a shared commitment to binding values that all agree 
are equally expressive of their deepest interests as human beings.  Without a convincing 
set of shared values struggles will continue to be distinct and diffuse, able to achieve 
temporary local gains at the expense of building sufficient social power to effect more 
secure, pervasive, and transformational objectives.
As I noted in the introduction, socialism has had its greatest influence when it generated 
broad-based social agreement as to its efficacy as a solution to general social crises.  There 
is an emerging sense, I also argued, of a growing global crisis.  What is lacking is any agreed 
upon framework of values to combat it.  The life-ground of value, I suggested, supplies the 
basis for discovering that framework in the needs and capabilities demonstrably harmed 
by the value system and social dynamics of global capitalism.  What remains now is to 
spell out the alternative framework of values, whose roots lie in the social-organic nature 
of human being, as, in essence, socialist.
To begin this task let us reflect for a moment on the meaning of ‘value.’ This term can 
best be understood by thinking about the relation between a valuing subject and an object 
that has value for him or her.  The value of an object alters the relation of the subject to 
the object in such a way that the one for whom the object has value determines his or 
her activity so as to realize the value of the object.  In general I define value as ‘that in 
the object which makes it an object of care and concern for a subject,’ where ‘care and 
concern’ serve to indicate that people regard the value of objects as legitimate reasons to 
alter their behaviour in relation to them.  Art objects, for example, have aesthetic value 
which gives people a reason to contemplate them and protect them from damage.  Food has 
nutritional value which gives people a reason to eat and not waste it.  Money has economic 
value which gives people a reason to spend it wisely.  Mementos have sentimental value 
which gives people a reason to cherish them.  I could multiply the examples, but what I 
want to draw attention to is what all these different forms of value share.  In every case the 
value is related to expanding the life-capabilities of the subject in question.  Every object 
of value would lose whatever value it has were there no subjects to value it.  Nevertheless, 
values are not simply arbitrary inventions of the subject.  The subject values the object in 
question because of the contribution that object makes to its own (perceived) well-being. 
Value judgements can of course be poorly made.  The difference between that which is 
of real value and that which is of perceived value but in reality of actual disvalue can be 
determined in relation to what I called above the ‘life-ground’ of value.  The life-ground, 
recall, is the set of conditions without which life cannot reproduce itself and/or most fully 
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develop its individually meaningful and socially valuable capabilities.  Satisfying the 
objective conditions of life’s reproduction and development is the material condition of 
expanding life-value.  Interaction with art increases the refinement of our sensibilities, 
eating nutritious food gives us the energy needed to undertake physically and intellectually 
demanding tasks.  In short, the growth of these vital capabilities is the underlying life-
value that connects all objects of value to valuing subjects.  
Human beings differ from other life forms in so far as our life-requirements are satisfied (or 
not) within social, institutional, symbolic, and normative frameworks.  The institutional, 
symbolic, and normative context of human life makes human life richer, but also creates the 
potential for a contradiction that does not affect other living things.  Animals might make 
particular mistakes about whether a given object has life-value or not (a ‘nuisance’ bear, 
for example, might step into a trap bated with poisoned food).  Animal communities do 
not, however, create symbolic and normative frameworks that rely upon a set of values that 
contradict their underlying life-interests.  If there is enough food, animals survive, if there 
is not, they die.  There are no examples where animal communities construct symbolic and 
normative frameworks that systematically undermine their essential interest in satisfying 
their life-needs.  Human societies, however, regularly construct such frameworks.  In those 
cases there is a contradiction between system-needs and underlying objective life-needs. 
Global capitalism, understood according to the manifestations of crisis explained above, 
is the most universal form of this contradiction.  
The contradiction between system needs and life-needs occurs when the regulating 
principles of institutions and the motivating values of individual lives confuse what is of 
value to the reproduction of the specific social system with what is of real value to human 
life.  Global capitalism is a generalized form of this basic value disorder.  Here both 
institutional and individual values prioritise the growth of money - for nation, firm, and 
self - over maintaining and improving the natural and social conditions of life-maintenance 
and development. This means, recall, that the growth of money-value is assumed to equal 
the growth of life-value, with the result that life-development is reduced to a mere means 
of money-growth.  Once this value inversion has taken hold people become unable to 
distinguish between what is in everyone’s shared interests from what is necessary to 
maintain the given way of life.  Wholesale destruction of other animal and human life 
can then be accepted as the necessary cost of maintaining ‘our’ way of life.  Other life 
is valued or disvalued not according to its intrinsic nature, but only in so far as it can be 
marshalled in the service of the particular social system and its specific values.  Societies 
can therefore become programmed in such a way that practices which tend toward the 
destruction of life’s universal conditions of maintenance and development are generally 
supported as ‘good.’  Because the life-ground of value is objectively real, however, the 
reality of the contradiction will eventually be proven to the system’s defenders, not by 
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political, philosophical, or scientific argument, but the observable degradation and 
destruction of the living beings who depend upon it for their health and activity.  Witness 
the (at least rhetorical) mass conversion of the right wing to ‘environmentalism’ in the first 
two months of 007. 
 
Judging the effects of social dynamics, institutions, and normative frameworks from the 
perspective of life value, by contrast, solves the contradiction between life-needs and 
system needs by demonstrating the necessary foundation of particular interests, goals, 
and life-projects in the social satisfaction of the permanent life-interests of everyone. 
Clean air and water, comfortable shelter, education, institutions that cultivate our creative 
capabilities, participation in public affairs, and free time are not the exclusive interest of 
any class, sex, race, or geo-historical form of civilization (i.e. the ‘West.’).  If one objects 
to the life-grounded framework that, while it might identify a shared set of interests, it 
nevertheless rests upon an unacceptable paternalism that undermines people’s primary 
need, that is, to choose their life freely, the defender of life-value has three responses.
     
First, there is no meaningful choice without the satisfaction of the material conditions 
responsible for there being options to choose between.  By setting out the basic material 
(natural and social) conditions of there being options, the life-grounded account of the 
normative foundation of socialism promotes rather than denies the freedom of choice of 
life-activity.  
Second, the understanding of human nature at work here does not reduce human interests 
to abstract biological needs but integrates the biological and the social, the material and 
the symbolic.  As social beings humans always find themselves in contexts where decisions 
have to be made about resource production and distribution and the general principles of 
collective life-regulation.  As these decisions can make people’s lives better or worse, it 
follows from the life-grounded perspective that everyone has a need to participate in those 
decisions (since needs exist wherever a form of deprivation will cause objective harm). 
Hence there is no question of repeating the Stalinist mistake of establishing, in the words 
of Agnes Heller, Ferenc Feher, and Gyogy Marcus (1986), a ‘dictatorship over needs.’ 
Once essential needs have been identified by the application of the criterion explained 
above, democratic deliberation is required to identify concrete social priorities and the 
most acceptable means of satisfying them.  That democratic approach to problems of social 
production is the very socio-economic heart of socialism and contrasts with the essentially 
undemocratic and need-depriving procedures and outcomes of global capitalism. 
 
Finally, not even the most ardent neo-liberal rejects the difference between liberty and 
license.  No social formation and its justifying ideologies permit people to do anything 
they want without regard for others.  The life-grounded normative foundation for socialism 
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makes explicit the principle of legitimate life-activity implicit but only ever confusedly 
articulated in classical liberalism.  This principle has two permutations, one negative and 
one positive.  The negative permutation rules out forms of individual and collective activity 
that demonstrably harm the life-interests of others.  The positive permutation affirms as of 
highest value those forms of individual and collective activity that enable the capabilities 
of others.  Conceived in abstraction from contextual limits on its realization, the good life 
is a life that is maximally meaningful for the individual and maximally valuable for the 
society. As McMurtry argues: 
The individual is not reducible to, but grounded on, this social life-host for self-
articulation to be possible.  The individual achieves individuality by expressing 
this social life-ground in some way - caring for or educating the next generation, 
speaking for the larger community what has not yet been heard, helping to produce 
goods needed by others as a unique contribution, and in general bridging the 
individual-social division by service to the larger community in some form to be an 
individual (1999: 90).
 
That ideal can be approached to the extent that universally needed life-resources are 
collectively controlled, developed according to life-grounded principles, distributed 
according to the principle of ‘each according to her or his needs’, and utilised according 
to individual principles of life-governance freed from the irrational demands of consumer 
capitalism. To cite McMurtry again, “production and distribution for life need, and that, 
in turn, for life-capacity and experience in more comprehensive enjoyment and expression 
- this is the only ultimate value on earth– and any sane economy is there to serve it” (2002: 
24).  
Conclusion 
The life-grounded conception of the normative foundation of socialism articulates at the 
highest level of generality the demands that different oppressed groups have made against 
the forms of exclusion and need-deprivation that have defined the history of capitalism. 
The institutionalization of the demands of those struggles has generated a history of social 
(as opposed to abstract political) democratization.  In other words, whether one is talking 
about the enfranchisement of women and excluded racial minorities, legal limitations 
on the work day, public funding of education, libraries, art galleries, or redistributing 
income from profits to wages, the general trend of social development has been towards 
increased need-satisfaction on the three planes of life-requirement discussed above. As 
these levels of life-requirement are equally organic, social-symbolic, and temporal, there 
is no question here of reducing different histories of oppression to a single economistic 
explanation.  Instead, oppression is understood according to a normatively universal 
model of life-requirement deprivation.  The content of the histories of specific forms of 
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deprivation vary according to the real structure of experience of differently oppressed 
groups.  Identity and difference in the history of oppression is dialectically united in such 
a way that autonomy in the articulation of particular experience is preserved within an 
overall framework of shared commitment to a new social reality. The satisfaction of all 
life-requirements - physical, symbolic, and temporal - is the agreed upon priority of all 
struggles leading to that new social reality.   
The life-grounded foundation of socialism is not an anachronism, therefore, but in fact the 
general expression of a long-term trend of social development whose gains are currently 
being rolled back by global capitalism.   Read at its most profound normative level, the 
theme of the story of social democratization links the manifold struggles of distinct 
oppressed groups to secure access to democratic control over the shared material and 
social conditions of human life.  The life-grounded perspective does not deny that there 
are separate histories of struggle and oppression but maintains that different forms of 
oppression are concrete experiences of the same general form of systemic need-deprivation 
in the three dimensions of life-need discussed in the first section.  Hence it also posits a 
universal goal of different political struggles against oppression: social and natural wealth 
is to be produced and distributed in order to satisfy the fundamental needs of human 
beings such that they are enabled to realize their capabilities through self-given projects. 
If that is not the general principle of socialism, it is not clear to me what is.
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